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Gateways, payment providers (PSP) and processors

Processing cards for others means answering for more than others do.

PCI DSS, the payment card security standard, has a set of requirements that exists only for companies serving other companies, plus an entire appendix for those hosting multiple customers in one shared environment. DM11 guides your company down the right route, without the nasty surprise of finding the real size of the job mid-assessment.

Find my routeTalk to a specialist

DM11 prepares your company. We are not a QSA, the qualified assessor, and we do not issue the Report on Compliance (RoC), the Attestation of Compliance (AOC) or certificates. Where a formal assessment is required, it is conducted by a partner QSA, qualified by the PCI SSC, the council that maintains the standard.

Who runs the preparation

  • 17 years in information security and compliance
  • PCI DSS projects in payments, retail and hospitality
  • In-house penetration testing (pentest) and vulnerability management
  • Experience with bank and Big Four audits

The question that decides everything

Are you a merchant, a service provider, or both?

The answer changes everything: which requirements apply, how you prove them and how often you repeat each routine. The standard calls a service provider anyone who processes, stores or transmits card data on behalf of another company, or who can affect the security of that data. Gateways, sub-acquirers, facilitators and processors all count. And a company that sells directly and also processes for others carries both roles at once.

Carrying both roles is common

The standard itself expects this: when a company is a merchant and a provider at once, the requirements that apply only to providers cover the part of the business that provides the service. In practice, these are two scopes inside one assessment. Treating them as one is a mistake that costs dearly.

Your customer will ask

Whoever hires you has to check on your compliance at least once every twelve months and know which requirements are yours, which are theirs and which you share. It is not curiosity: it is their own duty. And the answer you give decides whether the contract moves or stalls.

Being on the list is not enough

Appearing on a card brand's list of compliant providers helps your customer meet their annual check. But the standard is clear: to prove the requirements you meet on their behalf, the list alone is not enough. You are expected to hand over the AOC when asked.

Without a structured program

  • The customer's pre-contract check, the due diligence, stalling the contract for lack of an AOC and a responsibility matrix
  • Each customer asking for their own audit, one by one, all year long
  • Finding the real size of the scope only during the assessment, when fixing it costs far more
  • Requirements that apply only to providers handled as if they were merchant ones
  • An AOC marked as a partial assessment, which the customer reads as incomplete coverage

With the program in place

  • An AOC ready to hand over, with your service scope declared without caveats
  • A responsibility matrix that answers due diligence without a meeting
  • Semiannual and quarterly routines running as a calendar, not as an emergency
  • The right to join the card brand lists, which shortens your customers' validation
  • The ability to keep your own customers on the simplest questionnaire

What changes for a provider

The same standard, with obligations merchants do not carry

PCI DSS marks a series of requirements as applying only to service providers, and it doubles the frequency of routines a merchant does once a year. Anyone building the program with a merchant mindset only realizes this far too late.

Current version

The version in force is PCI DSS v4.0.1, published in June 2024. Version 4.0 was retired in December 2024, so this is the only active version. The Report on Compliance template is at revision 3, from January 2025.

The clock turned in March 2025

Most of the new requirements in version 4 were only a recommendation until 31 March 2025 and became mandatory on that date. Several of them hit providers harder, especially the ones about six-month scoping and the ones in the shared environment appendix.

There is only one SAQ for providers

SAQ D for Service Providers is the only self-assessment questionnaire (SAQ) for a provider, and it is only for those a card brand deems eligible. It carries all the provider-only requirements and the shared environment appendix, which do not appear in the merchant SAQ.

Scope confirmed every six months

A merchant confirms scope once a year. A provider confirms every six months, and also after any significant change. The standard itself explains why: a provider's network tends to be larger, more complex and to change more often.

Semiannual segmentation testing

Where a merchant tests segmentation once a year, a provider tests every six months and after any change to segmentation controls. And whoever hosts multiple customers has a second test on top of that one.

The alternative to an annual assessment is worse

The standard gives a provider two options: run one assessment a year and give customers the proof, or be assessed on demand by each customer and take part in each of their assessments. The second trades one project a year for a queue of them.

Which route is yours

Four routes, and what separates them

Your route depends on how the data flows, who you serve and the volume you handle on behalf of others. Thresholds and how you validate are set by the card brands and your acquirer, not by the PCI Security Standards Council.

Your profileValidation routeWhat it demands
Card data never touches your environmentSAQ AThe shortest set of controls. It does not apply to service providers: it is a merchant route.
Data passes through you, but you sell to your own end customersSAQ D MerchantThe full standard from a merchant's point of view, without the provider-only requirements.
You process, store or transmit on behalf of other companies, within the brand's thresholdSAQ D Service ProviderThe full standard, plus the provider-only requirements, plus the shared environment appendix if you host multiple customers. Here you have to describe the result of each test, requirement by requirement, not just tick yes or no.
Above the brand's threshold, or where your acquirer requires itReport on ComplianceA formal assessment conducted by a QSA, in the official template, with the assessor confirming the scope on their own. It is also the way onto the card brands' compliant provider lists.

Visa publishes a threshold of 300,000 transactions a year to separate a Level 1 provider from a Level 2: Level 1 goes to a QSA Report on Compliance, and Level 2 to self-assessment. The quarterly external scan, run by an approved vendor, applies at both levels. Mastercard uses a different measure, by service category and annual volume, under its own program. Confirm your classification with your acquirer before choosing a route.

What applies only to you

Requirements that do not exist for merchants

The standard marks these requirements as applying only to service providers. Anyone building a program from generic PCI DSS material simply never sees them, and finds the gap when the assessor asks.

3.6.1.1

Documented cryptographic architecture

A description of every algorithm, protocol and key that protects stored data, with strength and expiry date, plus an inventory of the cryptographic modules, with type and location. And a key used in production cannot be reused in the test environment.

3.7.9

Keys shared with customers

If you share cryptographic keys with the customers you serve, you have to document and pass on guidance on how to transmit, store and update those keys securely.

8.2.3

Unique credential per customer

If you access your customers' environments remotely, the authentication factor has to be unique for each customer. A credential used for one customer cannot work for another.

8.3.10.1

Customer-user passwords

When a password is the only way your customer's user reaches card data, you have two options: either it changes every ninety days, or you check the account's situation in real time and decide access on the spot.

11.4.6

Semiannual segmentation testing

Every six months, and after any change to segmentation controls, to confirm the card environment is isolated from every out-of-scope system. Whoever runs it needs independence inside the company, but does not have to be a QSA.

11.5.1.1

Covert malware channels

Intrusion detection has to find, alert on and deal with the hidden communication channels that malware uses. And the incident response plan has to cover what to do when that is detected.

12.4.1 and 12.4.2

Governance and quarterly reviews

Senior management formally takes on responsibility for the program, with a charter that puts this on record and shares it with them. And every three months someone confirms the tasks are being done according to policy, always a person other than the one doing the task.

12.5.2.1 and 12.5.3

Semiannual scope and organizational change

Scope confirmation every six months, and a documented impact review whenever the company changes in a relevant way, such as a merger, acquisition or a change in who answers for the controls, with the result shared with senior management.

12.9.1 and 12.9.2

What you owe your customers

A written agreement acknowledging that you are responsible for the security of the data you hold on the customer's behalf. And answering, when asked, questions about your compliance status and about who answers for each requirement.

Shared environment

The appendix that exists because of you

The standard deals separately with those offering a shared service to multiple customers, with systems, infrastructure, applications or databases in common. The text names gateway and processing services in shared environments by name. Whoever only offers a shared data center, the colocation model, falls outside this appendix.

Separation in both directions

The provider does not enter the customer's environment without authorisation, and the customer does not enter the provider's environment without authorisation. Each customer reaches only their own card data and uses only the resources set aside for them, without getting in others' way.

A second semiannual pentest

Every six months, a penetration test confirms that the separation between customer environments is working. The standard is clear: this test is on top of the segmentation pentest, and does not replace it. They are two different exercises in the same half-year.

Per-customer logging, visible only to its owner

Logging is on by default for each customer's environment, and only the customer who owns that environment can view it, with the log location clearly told to them.

Forensics and a reporting channel

The ability to support forensic investigation right away in an incident affecting any customer, and a secure channel for customers to report incidents and vulnerabilities, with handling and remediation.

You cannot forbid customer pentests

Whoever runs a shared environment has to support the customers' external penetration testing. And the standard says why, plainly: forbidding it would leave their systems open to attack.

Worth noting what the standard itself observes: even where the provider meets these requirements, each customer stays responsible for meeting and validating the requirements of their own environment. Your compliance does not pass compliance on to those you serve, and promising that in a sale becomes a problem later.

What you hand your portfolio

Your integration model decides your customers' effort

Here is a competitive edge few people use. How you deliver the payment page decides which self-assessment your merchant customer can use, and the gap between the shortest and the next one is large. This is a selling point for your portfolio, and you can prove it in PCI Security Standards Council material.

How you integrateYour customer's self-assessmentCondition
Full outsourcing, such as a payment link sent to the cardholderSAQ AThe requirement to protect the page against scripts does not apply to this model.
Redirect from the customer's site to your environmentSAQ AThe script requirement does not apply to redirects either, as long as the other criteria are met.
Embedded page or form, typically via iframeSAQ AOnly if the customer protects the page themselves, or if you give written confirmation that your solution, installed as you instruct, protects the page against script attacks.
The customer's site controls the flow and affects the page's integritySAQ A-EPConsiderably longer. If you host the site and run a shared environment, meeting the multi-tenant appendix is a prerequisite for your customer to be eligible.
Card data reaches the customer's own siteSAQ D MerchantThe customer's environment comes fully into scope.

The third row is the opportunity. A provider that puts script management and change detection inside its own iframe solution, and issues the written confirmation, keeps its portfolio on the shortest self-assessment instead of pushing it to the next one. Those who do not, push. The final call on which self-assessment applies always rests with the customer's acquirer or card brand.

Who does what

Everyone's limits, stated before you hire anyone

In a market where people promise certificates they cannot issue, we would rather be clear from the start about who signs what. It changes what you should demand from us and what you need to solve with others.

Your company
Signs the self-assessment where the route is SAQ D-SP, and signs the attestation on any route. It is also the one that hands the AOC and the responsibility matrix to your customers.
DM11
Prepares. We design and reduce the scope, install the controls, write the policies and the cryptographic architecture, build the semiannual and quarterly routines, run the segmentation pentest and organize the proof. We are not a QSA and we do not issue RoC, AOC or certificates.
A partner QSA
Conducts the formal assessment and signs the Report on Compliance where that is your route. We work together, with separated roles: whoever prepared a control does not conduct its assessment.
An ASV
The approved scanning vendor (ASV) runs the external vulnerability scan every three months. Only companies approved by the PCI SSC can run that validation scan, and it applies to a provider of any level.
Your acquirer and card brand
Define your level, your validation route and where to send the proof. They also decide on the use of the customized approach. It is them you ask about your classification, not the PCI SSC.

Self-assessment

Which PCI DSS is yours, and what is missing to get there

The first questions classify your case and point to a validation route. The rest walk through the chapters of the standard and show where the gaps are. The full result appears on screen, with the route, a score for each chapter and what closes each gap. And we do not ask for your email to show it.

ProfileQuestion 1 of 25

How does card data move through your operation?

What each result means

The reading for each area, across the three result ranges. It is the same text emailed to those who identify themselves, published here for anyone who wants to understand what the score measures before answering.

Scope and segmentation

Below 50

Without segmentation the whole environment falls in scope, and the cost of compliance follows. It is the first thing to solve and the one that pays back most: every system taken out of scope is one less to control every year.

50 to 79

There is segmentation and no proof. The assessor asks for the test that demonstrates the isolation works, and without it a segmented network counts as a flat one.

80 or above

Scope well defined and tested. What usually goes missing is review: scope changes when a new system arrives, and most companies discover that at the next assessment.

Configuration and systems

Below 50

A system with factory settings and a default password is the most immediate finding there is. Start with secure configuration standards, which cover a good share of the technical questions at once.

50 to 79

A standard exists and is not checked. Configuration nobody verifies drifts on its own, and the assessor compares a sample against the written standard.

80 or above

Configuration under control. The next step is detecting drift automatically, so you do not depend on manual checks in an environment that changes weekly.

Stored data

Below 50

Storing the card number is what most inflates everything that follows. Find where it is, including logs, backups and email attachments, and delete whatever has no business justification.

50 to 79

Known storage is protected and residue remains. Application logs and old backups are the two places where the number reappears in the assessor's scan.

80 or above

Storage handled. Check retention: data kept beyond the defined period is a finding even when encrypted, because the standard asks for the business justification.

Transmission

Below 50

Card data crossing a public network without encryption is a serious and easily found failure. Start with an inventory of where data leaves, which usually has more paths than expected.

50 to 79

The main channels are encrypted and the protocol is old. The assessor checks version and configuration, not just the presence of encryption.

80 or above

Transmission protected. The detail that escapes is the end-user channel: messages and email carrying card numbers are still transmission, and the policy has to forbid it in writing.

Malware and phishing

Below 50

Without malware protection on the commonly affected systems, one of the basic controls is missing. It is quick to deploy and covers several questions.

50 to 79

Protection exists and phishing is not addressed. The standard treats phishing as its own control, and the assessor asks about both a technical mechanism and training.

80 or above

Mature protection. The next gain is evidence of effectiveness: proof that detection is current and that someone handles what it finds.

Secure development

Below 50

If the company develops what touches cards, the standard requires secure practice across the whole cycle. With no code review and no environment separation, there is nothing to present.

50 to 79

Review happens and leaves no trail. The assessor takes a sample of changes and asks for review evidence on each, and that is where the informal process shows.

80 or above

Mature development. Check secure coding training with a record per person per year, which is how the standard asks for it.

Access and authentication

Below 50

Shared accounts and access without need bring down a large part of the assessment at once. Start with named users and least privilege.

50 to 79

The basics are done and multi-factor does not cover everything. The standard requires the additional factor in more situations than most companies implement, including internal administrative access.

80 or above

Solid access management. Look at service and application accounts separately: they usually escape periodic review because they have no human owner.

Physical security

Below 50

Media and equipment without physical control cancel out the logical control. Start with access to the area where the data lives and with the handling of removable media.

50 to 79

The area is controlled and media has no defined destination. Disposal of disks and paper carrying card data needs a procedure and a record.

80 or above

Consistent physical control. Check card capture devices, which have their own rule of periodic inspection against tampering.

Logging and monitoring

Below 50

Without centralised logging there is no way to reconstruct what happened, and the standard is specific about what must be recorded. It is the control that helps most when something goes wrong.

50 to 79

The logs exist and nobody reads them. The standard asks for review, and the assessor asks who reviews, how often, and what was done about what turned up.

80 or above

Mature monitoring. What adds value now is retention as the standard requires and protection of the log itself against alteration.

Security testing

Below 50

Without vulnerability scanning and penetration testing, the evidence that controls hold is missing. Start with scanning, which has a defined cadence and is cheaper.

50 to 79

Tests happen and remediation does not close the loop. A finding with no deadline and no retest leaves the evidence incomplete, and the assessor looks for the retest.

80 or above

An established testing programme. Check external scanning by an approved vendor, which has its own requirement and is where the schedule usually slips.

Third parties and customers

Below 50

A provider that touches cards has to be listed and have its compliance confirmed. Without that list, the company answers for a risk it does not know.

50 to 79

The list exists and the matrix is missing. Which control is yours and which is the provider's has to be written and agreed, or both assume the other does it.

80 or above

A well-managed chain. The next step is annual follow-up of each provider's compliance, with a date and a document, rather than trust.

Program governance

Below 50

With no owner and no policy, compliance becomes one person's effort and dies when they leave. Start with a formal assignment of responsibility.

50 to 79

A policy exists and the routine does not. The standard turned several activities into obligations with a frequency, and the assessor checks the calendar, not the intention.

80 or above

A governed programme. What sets you apart from here is the targeted risk analysis, where used, which needs a documented method and annual review.

Shared environment

Below 50

If the company hosts environments for more than one customer, separation between them is the central control, and the standard has its own requirements for it.

50 to 79

Separation exists and is not documented per customer. The assessor asks for isolation evidence and the responsibility matrix for each contract.

80 or above

A shared environment handled well. Check what you hand customers as evidence: a mature provider supplies the package ready, and that becomes a commercial argument.

How we run it

From scope to evidence the assessor accepts

Every phase ends with a deliverable. You know what you get before you start.

  1. 01

    Define the scope

    We map the data flow, the connected systems and the ones that affect the environment's security. We separate the merchant track from the provider track when a company carries both roles, because treating them as one distorts everything downstream.

    You get

    • Flow map and network diagram
    • Declared scope, with what was excluded and why
    • Route classification to confirm with your acquirer
  2. 02

    Shrink the territory

    Before installing any control, we clear out what does not need to be in scope. Segmentation, ending unnecessary storage and reviewing integrations shrink the whole program at once.

    You get

    • Scope reduction plan
    • Segmentation design
    • Estimated impact per chapter
  3. 03

    Close the gaps

    We work with your team on what is missing in each chapter, with special attention to the provider-only requirements and the shared environment appendix, which are usually left out.

    You get

    • Controls implemented per chapter
    • Documented cryptographic architecture
    • Approved policies and procedures
  4. 04

    Build the routines

    Provider compliance is a calendar, not a project. We set up the quarterly reviews, the six-month scope confirmation, the pentests at the right frequency and the quarterly scan.

    You get

    • Routine calendar with owners
    • Record template for each review
    • Segmentation pentest executed
  5. 05

    Prepare the customer relationship

    We build what your customers' due diligence will ask for: a responsibility matrix per requirement, the written responsibility agreement and the process for answering status requests.

    You get

    • Responsibility matrix
    • Customer agreement template
    • Due diligence response process
  6. 06

    Take it to assessment

    We organize the proof in the format the assessor expects and run a rehearsal before the real assessment. Where the route is a Report on Compliance, we line things up with the partner QSA, keeping the roles separate.

    You get

    • Evidence file per requirement
    • Dry run with findings fixed beforehand
    • Support during the assessment

Stories

Four situations we have already solved

We swap our clients' names with the same confidentiality that will protect your company later. The names change, and the pattern of the problems repeats.

Payment gateway

Found out at the assessment that it was a service provider

Situation
The company built its program from generic PCI DSS material and reached the assessment without the provider-only requirements. The documented cryptographic architecture, the quarterly execution reviews and the six-month scope confirmation were all missing. The environment was sound; it was the program that was incomplete.
What we did
We went requirement by requirement, sorting what applied because it was a provider from what applied because it was a merchant, since the company carried both roles. Then we built the routines with a calendar and named owners, rather than treating them as a one-off deliverable.
Outcome
The next assessment had no finding tied to a provider requirement. The least expected gain was managerial: the board started receiving a quarterly summary that had not existed before.
Facilitator in a shared environment

One pentest where two were needed

Situation
The company ran the segmentation penetration test every six months and thought the matter settled. But it hosted dozens of customers on the same infrastructure, and the separation between their environments needs its own test, on top of that one.
What we did
We separated the two exercises and designed the customer-separation test, with simulated environments to try to reach one customer from another. We also adjusted the logging so each customer could see only their own environment.
Outcome
The gap closed before the assessment, not during it. The separation test found a lateral path the segmentation test would not have caught, because it was looking at a different boundary.
Sub-acquirer

The due diligence that was stalling contracts

Situation
Each corporate customer sent its own questionnaire and asked for proof of compliance. With no responsibility matrix and an incomplete attestation, the sales team spent weeks per contract and some deals simply stopped.
What we did
We built the matrix that splits each requirement between the company and the customer, standardized the written responsibility agreement and set up the response process, with the material ready to send.
Outcome
Answering due diligence stopped being a project and became an attachment. The time to signature dropped noticeably, and sales stopped pulling in the technical team for every request.
Checkout provider

It was pushing its own portfolio onto the bigger questionnaire

Situation
The product delivered the payment page embedded, but with no script inventory or change detection. As a result, the merchant customers could not sustain the shortest self-assessment and fell into the next one, much longer. Some began looking at competitors because of it.
What we did
We put script management and change detection inside the solution itself, and set up the written confirmation the customer needs to receive to sustain eligibility.
Outcome
What had been an objection became a selling point. The provider started offering, alongside the product, the document that reduces the compliance effort of whoever hires it.

Frequently asked

What people ask before deciding

Answers grounded in the PCI Security Standards Council's standard and the card brand programs. Where no official figure exists, we say so.

No. DM11 is not a QSA and does not issue a Report on Compliance, attestation or certificate. We prepare: we design and reduce the scope, install the controls, build the recurring routines, run the segmentation pentest and organize the proof. Where your route requires a formal assessment, it is conducted by a qualified partner QSA, with the roles separated between whoever prepared and whoever assesses.

It depends on your level, which is set by the card brands and administered by your acquirer, not by the PCI SSC. Visa publishes a threshold of 300,000 transactions a year: above it, a Level 1 provider with a QSA Report on Compliance; below it, Level 2 with self-assessment. Mastercard uses service category and annual volume under its own program. The quarterly external scan by an approved vendor applies at both levels. Confirm your classification with your acquirer before deciding.

There is only one: SAQ D for Service Providers. And it is only for those a card brand deems eligible to self-assess. It carries all the provider-only requirements and the shared environment appendix, which do not exist in the merchant SAQ. Another difference that catches people coming from the merchant world: the current version asks you to describe the result of each requirement's test, not just tick whether it is met.

The standard covers exactly this situation: the requirements marked as provider-only apply to the part of the business that provides the service. In practice, these are two scope tracks inside the same assessment, and treating them as one distorts the sizing. It is one of the first things we separate at the start of a project, because everything that follows depends on it.

Beyond a set of requirements that simply does not exist for merchants, the frequency of important routines changes. Scope confirmation goes from annual to semiannual. Segmentation penetration testing goes from annual to semiannual, and also after any change to segmentation controls. Quarterly execution reviews come in, carried out by people who do not perform the task, along with formal executive accountability for the program. The standard itself explains why: a provider's network is larger, more complex and changes more often.

It adds an entire appendix, which the standard created for that case and in which it names gateway and processing services in shared environments by name. It requires separation in both directions between provider and customer, assurance that one customer cannot reach another's data or resources, per-customer logging visible only to the owner, a channel to report incidents and support for forensic investigation. And it requires a penetration test every six months of the separation between customers, which the standard expressly says is on top of the segmentation test. Two different exercises in the same half-year. Whoever offers only a shared data center, in the colocation model, falls outside this appendix.

No, and promising that in a sale becomes a problem later. The standard records that, even with the provider meeting the shared environment requirements, each customer stays responsible for meeting and validating the requirements of their own environment. What you do for a customer is reduce their effort, hand over proof and own your side of the responsibility matrix. That is a lot, and it sells, but it is not a transfer of compliance.

It does, a lot, and it is a commercial lever few people use. If you deliver by redirect or full outsourcing, the requirement to protect the page against scripts does not fall on the customer. If you deliver an embedded page via iframe, the customer only sustains the shortest self-assessment by protecting the page themselves or by receiving written confirmation from you that your solution, installed as you instruct, protects against script attacks. A provider that installs the script inventory and the change detection and issues that confirmation keeps its portfolio on the shorter route. Those who do not push the customer onto the next route, which is much longer.

It is, with one caveat. The standard recognizes that being on a brand's list can be enough proof for the customer to meet their annual status check, as long as it is clear that the services they hired were covered by the assessment. But to prove the requirements you meet on the customer's behalf, the list is not enough: you are expected to hand over the attestation when asked. At the two main brands, the way onto the list runs through a formal QSA assessment and a registration done by the acquirer or the institution sponsoring you.

You can, and the standard provides for that option, but it is worth understanding what it means in practice. The two official alternatives are: run one assessment a year and give customers the proof, or be assessed on demand by each customer and take part in each of their assessments, delivering the result to each. In the second, you trade one exercise a year for a queue of them, with different teams, different deadlines and different scopes. For anyone with a sizeable portfolio, it usually costs more in money and in technical team time.

It is the version 4 novelty that lets you meet a requirement's objective with a control different from the one the standard describes. The text is clear about who it is for: companies mature in risk management, willing to take on a documentation and validation effort greater than the traditional approach. It requires a controls matrix, a risk analysis per control and documented effectiveness testing, and it has to be documented by a QSA or a qualified internal assessor. Anyone doing a self-assessment cannot use it. It also does not combine with a compensating control. It usually makes sense in modern architecture, where the real control does not look like the wording of the standard.

Version 4.0.1, published in June 2024. Version 4.0 was retired in December 2024, so it is the only active version. The Report on Compliance template is at revision 3, from January 2025. Worth noting the date that catches a lot of people: most of the new requirements in version 4 were only a recommendation until 31 March 2025 and became mandatory on that date. A program documented before that and not revised probably has a gap.

It depends on two things that only become clear in the diagnosis: the real size of the scope and how much of it can be reduced right at the start. We do not publish a standard timeline because it would be guesswork, and because the PCI SSC does not release a typical project duration. What we can say for sure is that scope definition is what moves the schedule most, and that hiring an assessment before knowing the size of the environment usually costs a whole cycle.

The PCI SSC does not publish failure statistics, so we do not repeat a blog ranking. What the official material itself warns about is useful and easy to check: a requirement does not count as met just because it is planned for later; the answer cannot be copied from another requirement or from a previous cycle; and a requirement excluded without analysis has to be marked as not tested, which shows up on the attestation as a partial assessment. On scope, the published rule of thumb is to start by assuming everything is in scope until you prove otherwise, and the assessor confirms the scope on their own, noting where they disagreed with yours.

More questions? Talk to DM11

Start by knowing which PCI DSS is yours

A thirty-minute conversation is usually enough to separate what is a provider obligation, what is a merchant one, and which validation route applies to your case. No obligation.

Talk to a specialistTake the self-assessment

Comparisons on this subject

  • ISO 27001 vs NIST CSF
  • CIS Controls vs ISO 27001
See all 13 comparisons

Sources and references

  • Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard

    PCI Security Standards Council · PCI DSS v4.0.1 · accessed on July 28, 2026

  • Application Security Verification Standard

    OWASP Foundation · ASVS 5.0 · accessed on July 29, 2026

Published on
July 24, 2026
Last reviewed on
August 01, 2026
Editorial review
DM11 Consultoria em Segurança da Informação Ltda

This page is informational and describes how DM11 reads and applies the sources above. It does not reproduce the text of any standard, does not replace reading the official document, and does not replace an audit, a certification, an independent assessment or legal advice. Where a standard requires formal assessment, it is carried out by an accredited body, auditor or assessor, always separate from whoever did the preparation.

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